BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
2001:418::/32
Announced exactly
- 2001:418::/32AS2914NTT America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418::
- Registry
- ARIN · United States · May 24, 2000
- Delegated block
- 2001:418:: – 2001:418:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 2001:418:1::/48AS3130RGnet OURPKI Valid2001:418:1::
- 2001:418:c06::/48AS262NTT America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:c06::
- 2001:418:1410::/48AS2000Internet Awareness, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:1410::
- 2001:418:1411::/48AS213802Tianfeng (Hong Kong) Communications LimitedRPKI Valid2001:418:1411::
- 2001:418:1416::/48AS396350Boom CommunicationsRPKI Valid2001:418:1416::
- 2001:418:1439::/48AS1225NTT America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:1439::
- 2001:418:144d::/48AS275NTT America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:144d::
- 2001:418:144e::/47AS15562Job SnijdersRPKI Valid2001:418:144e::
- 2001:418:1450::/48AS3938NTT America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:1450::
- 2001:418:149b::/48AS152644QINIU LimitedRPKI Valid2001:418:149b::
- 2001:418:149c::/48AS152644QINIU LimitedRPKI Valid2001:418:149c::
- 2001:418:149d::/48AS93NTT America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:149d::
- 2001:418:3807::/48AS4128RGnet OURPKI Valid2001:418:3807::
- 2001:418:4005::/48AS1412Gravity Interactive, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:4005::
- 2001:418:8004::/48AS7019NTT America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:8004::
- 2001:418:8005::/48AS7019NTT America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:8005::
- 2001:418:8006::/48AS3927RGnet OURPKI Valid2001:418:8006::
- 2001:418:9808::/48AS21778Dimension Data North America, Inc.RPKI Valid2001:418:9808::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 49.224.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.