BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
219.147.128.0/17
Announced exactly
- 219.147.128.0/17AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Valid219.147.128.0
- Registry
- APNIC · China · Mar 21, 2002
- Delegated block
- 219.144.0.0 – 219.147.255.255
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 219.147.128.0/20AS17897asn for Heilongjiang Provincial Net of CTRPKI Valid219.147.128.0
- 219.147.129.0/24AS17897asn for Heilongjiang Provincial Net of CTRPKI Valid219.147.129.0
- 219.147.130.0/24AS17897asn for Heilongjiang Provincial Net of CTRPKI Valid219.147.130.0
- 219.147.133.0/24AS17897asn for Heilongjiang Provincial Net of CTRPKI Valid219.147.133.0
- 219.147.136.0/24AS17897asn for Heilongjiang Provincial Net of CTRPKI Valid219.147.136.0
- 219.147.137.0/24AS17897asn for Heilongjiang Provincial Net of CTRPKI Valid219.147.137.0
- 219.147.140.0/23AS137698Haerbing , Heilongjiang Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid219.147.140.0
- 219.147.142.0/24AS137698Haerbing , Heilongjiang Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid219.147.142.0
- 219.147.144.0/20AS17897asn for Heilongjiang Provincial Net of CTRPKI Valid219.147.144.0
- 219.147.152.0/23AS137698Haerbing , Heilongjiang Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid219.147.152.0
- 219.147.154.0/24AS137698Haerbing , Heilongjiang Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid219.147.154.0
- 219.147.157.0/24AS137698Haerbing , Heilongjiang Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid219.147.157.0
- 219.147.231.0/24AS137698Haerbing , Heilongjiang Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid219.147.231.0
- 219.147.232.0/23AS137698Haerbing , Heilongjiang Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid219.147.232.0
- 219.147.248.0/21AS17897asn for Heilongjiang Provincial Net of CTRPKI Valid219.147.248.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 49.224.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.